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In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which 
partake of “living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is 
argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation (i.e. “merely living animals”) if we 
consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing 
more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is 
concluded that some of Aristotle’s merely living animals would be certain kinds of sponge, 
certain sea anemones and the ascidians among testacea.     
 
 
Introduction 
 
Aristotle starts Parts of Animals, II.10 by addressing the necessary parts of all 
complete animals and then, representing the living world on a scale ranging from plants to 
mankind, he says: 
It is, then, of the nature of plants, being immobile, not to have many forms of the non-uniform parts; for few 
actions [πράξεις] require the use of few instruments. Accordingly, we should study the visible character of 
plants independently. But those [living beings] that have, in addition to life, sensation, are more polymorphic in 
visible character and some of these more than others. And there is still greater variety among those whose nature 
partakes not only of living but, in addition, of living well. Such is mankind; for of the animals known to us, 
either mankind alone, or mankind most of all, partakes of the divine (655b37-656a8, slightly modified).1 
In the above passage, we read Aristotle as considering the possibility of a certain 
participation in living well by animals other than man. This does not come as a complete 
surprise for students of Aristotelian biology, since—throughout his biological treatises—
Aristotle frequently uses the distinction between parts or traits that animals possess 
necessarily, on the one hand, and those, on the other, which exist for the sake of some good 
purpose.2 There is, however, another crucial and particular point in this passage: it elliptically 
suggests the existence of certain animals whose nature partakes only of living. Commentators 
                                                          
1
 For PA, I use the Lennox translation (2001b). For Books VII-X of HA, I use Balme’s translation 
(1991). All other translations of Aristotle’s works are my own. 
2
 For just a few examples among many, see DA III.12, 434b22-29; Sens. 1, 436b18-437a3; PA I.1, 
640a33-b1; II.2, 647b29-30; III.7, 670b23-27; IV.12, 694b5-9; GA I.4, 717a15-16; IA 15, 712b30-31. 
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seem to neglect this aspect of the passage3 and the question of which creatures can be said to 
“partake only of living” despite their capacity for sensation. The answer seems obvious: those 
animals would be the most primitive and the least complex ones. Agreed, but which ones? 
Above all, why those? The present paper offers a partial answer to these questions and it sets 
out to explore one strict biological sense in which an animal can be said to live merely in 
Aristotle’s biology.  
The argument defended in sections 1-4 of the paper is the following. Aristotle thinks 
that some animals “merely live,” just like plants. He defines merely living as living a life 
confined to nutritive activities. This is one strict biological sense in which an animal can be 
said to live merely in Aristotelian biology. Thus, animals that are confined to lives consisting 
of nutritive actions would also be said to merely live. However, their being confined to 
nutritive life cannot be due to their possessing nothing more than nutritive soul, because such 
an animal does not exist for Aristotle. Since their being confined to nutritive life cannot be 
explained by being confined to nutritive soul, the next best explanation views them as living a 
perceptive form of nutritive life; and the best way of doing this is to show the nutritive 
character of their perceptive natures. It will be argued that the perceptive nature of these 
animals is so rudimentary that it makes their actions hardly different from a plant’s. In other 
words, it is with regard to their perceptive nature that these animals are plant-like. An 
examination of the nature of the sense of touch closes this argument. Section 5 is devoted to 
exploring this thesis in the cases of specific types of sea creatures. 
     
I. Not only alive, but animal 
 
To address the question of what a “merely living animal” would be for Aristotle, it is 
helpful to determine what it means for him to say of something that it has life, in the simplest 
sense of the term. De Anima seems to provide a straightforward answer to this question. 
According to Aristotle, the principle in virtue of which life belongs to all living beings is the 
nutritive soul (II.2, 413b1-2), which originates and causes activities shared by all living 
                                                          
3
 See for example Lennox (2001b, p. 222) and Pellegrin (2011, p. 501 n. 2). The only exception I 
know is Gotthelf (1989, p. 123). Gotthelf seems to understand this passage as dividing the animals 
into those which partake of living-well and those which do not. However, he does not elaborate on 
this point. I also believe that it is natural to understand this passage as dividing the animals into those 
which partake of living-well and those which do not. It is obvious that for Aristotle living-well is 
grounded in partaking of the divine. On the relation between living-well and partaking of the divine 
see Lennox (2001b, pp. 222-3). On the “divine element” in animal constitution and its relation to 
scala naturae, see Code (1997, pp. 299-311).  
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 115-134, 2015. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p115-134 
116
  
things. The form of life for which it is responsible is, then, the most basic. The nutritive soul 
and its peculiar activities constitute the very threshold between inanimate and animate nature, 
since it is both the necessary and the sufficient condition for something to be considered 
alive.4 
Nutrition, reproduction, and growth are the nutritive capacity’s peculiar activities.5 As 
in the case of plants, the nutritive form of life can be found in nature, separately from the 
higher capacities of soul with which more complex creatures are endowed.6 These higher 
organisms, however, cannot operate without the nutritive capacity. In the order of nature, 
then, living in its most elementary sense is a vegetative form of life, which consists primarily 
in those activities peculiar to the nutritive soul. 
That Aristotle associates mere living with vegetative life can also be seen from the 
locution he habitually uses to distinguish animals from plants: we call them “not only alive 
but animals.” At DA II.2, 413b2-4, for example, when explaining the principal difference 
between animals and plants, Aristotle says, “those beings, which do not move or change 
place, but are endowed with sensation, we call animals and not merely living things [οὐ ζῆν 
μόνον].”7 To the question concerning what Aristotle means by “mere living,” we have this 
first answer: mere living is a vegetative form of life, as distinct from perceptive animal life. 
 
II. Animal, and the “plant” in it 
 
However, the binary character of this conclusion does not seem to adequately 
represent Aristotle’s supposition, at PA II.10, 655b38-656a8, that certain creatures “live 
only” despite their perceptive nature. There, Aristotle seems to suppose three groups of living 
beings. He first distinguishes those that only live from those that “not only live but also have 
sensation.” In such a binary division of living things, plants embody the first group, whereas 
the second group includes all animals together, since sensation is their defining 
characteristic:8 they “have sensation in addition to life.”9 
                                                          
4
 DA II.4, 415a23-25. 
5
 Or, these can be considered as sub-faculties of the nutritive faculty (Polansky, 2007, 200-222). See 
also DA II.1, 412a14-15; 2, 413a24-31; 4, 415a22-23; 415b25-27; 416a8-9; 416a19 and 416b9-25. 
6
 See DA II.2, 413a31-34; 413b5-6; II.3, 414a32-33; 415a1-5. On the simplicity of plants as 
substances, see Sprague (1991). 
7
 The same locution is used at 656a3-4. See also IA 4, 705b8-10; GA I.23, 731b4-7; Juv. 1, 467b18-27 
and 3, 469a18-20. 
8
 DA II.2, 413b2: τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 115-134, 2015. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p115-134 
117
  
Yet, it seems this first division does not determine the threshold for “living only”, 
below which there still seems to be certain creatures, besides plants, which are endowed with 
sensation. This accounts for a third group of living beings, isolated within the animal world 
itself: there are animals whose capacity for sensation is not sufficient for them to count as 
going beyond mere living. In such animals, sensation does not make enough of a difference, 
in comparison to plants, to take them beyond mere living. Although the difference between 
nutritive and perceptive souls marks the threshold separating animals from plants, for some 
animals, having sensation does not correspond to a life beyond mere living, which is 
characterized primarily by the kinds of activities pertaining to the nutritive capacity. So, if we 
were to reclassify these three groups of living being according to the threshold of “living 
only”, then we should classify those animals together with plants. In other words, the binary 
division of the living world into plants or animals is too simple, and calls for a third category: 
those animals that are merely alive. 
The idea of grouping some lower animals together with plants on the basis that the 
nutritive activity is preponderant in both of their lives might be thought to find support in the 
following passage from Generation of Animals, I. 23, where Aristotle provides insight into 
what would be ‘mere living’ in animals: 
It is by sensation that animals differ from things, which are merely alive [τῶν ζώντων μόνον]. Yet, since it 
necessarily lives, if it is an animal, when there is need to perform the function of the living thing, then it couples 
and unites and becomes as if it were a plant (731b4-7). 
Here, Aristotle identifies the mere living of animals with activities corresponding to 
those of the ‘plant in the animal’. Moreover, in this passage we also have a parallel tripartite 
division to PA II.10, 655b38-656a8: first are distinguished the creatures that only live from 
animals; then, within the individual animal organism itself, generation is distinguished (from 
sensation) as the moment of merely living, like a plant.10 
It would be erroneous, however, to conclude from this parallelism that merely living 
animals live solely by their nutritive souls. That would be a contradiction in terms. Such an 
animal, that is, an animal whose life has nothing but nutritive soul as its principle, does not 
exist for Aristotle. For him, animal life is, by definition, perceptive, and defining animal by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9
 For sensation as the defining principal of animal life, see also Sens. 1, 436b10-12; Somn. 1, 454a8-
10; b24; PA II.1, 647a21; III.4, 666a34-35; and Met. Z.10, 1035b16-18. 
10
 Note however that these two passages are not making the same tripartite division: in the PA 
passage, the distinction is between living beings and here in the GA passage, the distinction is 
partially between living beings and partially between soul capacities within the animal. 
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sensation is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian psychology.11 Therefore, limiting their 
animal life to their nutritive souls cannot be his way of grouping merely living animals with 
plants. Their lives’ being confined to nutritive activities cannot be explained by their being 
confined to nutritive souls because they are not so confined. 
If, nonetheless, there exist, according to Aristotle, animals that only live, and if, by 
this designation, he does not mean animals endowed solely with nutritive souls, then he must 
be supposing an animal way of merely living. The last passage from GA gives a misleading 
perspective on the question because we are not trying to understand mere living in animals, 
but animals that merely live. We are not concerned with the “plant in the animal,” but with 
plantlike animals, that is, creatures that live like plants, even though they are perceptive. 
 
III. Not only animal, but also plant 
 
Aristotle’s merely living animals would then be plantlike, that is, leading a nutritive 
sort of life, without being plants. This indicates that they are to be found among those 
borderline creatures at the obscure edges of the plant-animal boundary, as described in the 
following lines from History of Animals:12 
Nature proceeds from the inanimate to the animals by such small steps that, because of the continuity 
[συνεχείᾳ], we fail to see to which side the boundary—that is—the middle between them belongs. […] The 
change from them [plants] to the animals is continuous, as we said before. For some of those in the sea might 
raise for one the question whether they are animal or plant; for they grow attached, and, if separated, many of 
this sort are destroyed: for the pinnas grow like plants and the razor-shells cannot live after being pulled up. And 
in general the entire testacean kind resembles plants in comparison with the animals that move about. 
And with regard to sensation, some of them give no sign at all, others faintly. The body of some has a nature 
that is fleshlike, for example those called tethya [i.e. ascidians] and the sea anemone kind; but the sponge in 
every respect resembles the plants. But always, by a small difference at a time, one after another shows more 
possession of life and movement. 
And it is the same with the activities of their life [τὰς τοῦ βίου δὲ πράξεις]. For plants have no other evident 
function than to make another one like themselves, in those cases where they are produced through seed; and 
similarly in certain animals, too, one can grasp no other function besides generation (VII(VIII).1, 588b4-27, 
slightly modified).13 
Aristotle supposes a gradual and continuous change in the order of nature, from plants 
to animals. Yet, it is crucial to note that it is not with respect to one and the same 
characteristic, but with respect to different features, that these sea creatures are said to be 
                                                          
11
 On this point, see P.-M. Morel (2007, 71-89). 
12
 This passage has a doublet at PA IV.5, 681a10-25. 
13
 The animals mentioned in this passage generate spontaneously according to Aristotle. So, by the 
term generation here, what is meant cannot be sexual reproduction, but rather coming-to-be or the 
process of growth. HA V.15, 547b23-25 compares some testaceans according to rapidity of growth. 
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somewhere between plants and animals. They do not occupy the plant-animal boundary in 
one single respect. The traits with respect to which they are said to resemble plants are the 
following: (a) growing attached and not being able to survive when detached; (b) being 
deprived of locomotion; (c) absence or obscurity of the signs of sensation; and (d) having no 
other vital activity than generation.14 While it is true that lack of locomotion is an immediate 
consequence of growing attached, these two traits are to be distinguished from one another. 
Growing attached, these creatures are like plants, less because they cannot move, than 
because it marks the same frontier for them, as for plants, between life and death: once 
detached, they die. Further, the first two traits—growing attached and remaining stationary—
are not necessarily correlated with the last two—lacking signs of sensation and engaging in 
mere growth—since Aristotle explicitly recognizes sensation for certain fixed animals.15 The 
second set of traits has more bearing on the question whether these creatures are animals or 
plants because they transform the question into one of definition, calling the capacity of 
sensation—and thus animality—into question as such. This is not necessarily the case with 
the first two traits because they do not define an animal as an animal.16 It follows, therefore, 
that, more than growing attached and being stationary, it is the borderline character of their 
perceptive natures that makes them merely living animals, occupying the plant-animal 
boundary by living a nutritive sort of life.17 The cause of their plantlike mere living must be 
found in the very nature of their perceptive capacity. Things really must be as described in 
                                                          
14
 A complete list would also include: (e) lack of residual excretion (PA IV.5, 681a33-34 and b8), (f) 
reversed positions of up and down (PA IV.7, 683b19-20), and (g) absence of a male-female 
distinction (GA I.23, 731b10-11).  
15
 See DA I. 5, 410b19-20; II.2, 413b2-4 and II.3, 415a6-7. 
16
 Locomotion is sometimes treated by Aristotle as definitive of complete animality (see, for example, 
Phys., VII. 7, 261a13-23; DA III. 3, 427a17-21; III. 7, 43a6-7; III. 9, 423a15-17). However, the 
animality put in question by the above HA passage is animality as opposed to “vegetality”. This is 
what Jean-Louis Labarrière (2004, p.156) calls “the definition from below” of animality. Given that 
for Aristotle sensation is a prerequisite for animal locomotion, it is not really locomotion which 
defines animal in its opposition to a plant.   
17
 The Aristotelian notion of “dualizers” can certainly be evoked to explain the case of these animals: 
with respect to their stationary mode of living they tend towards plants, but with respect to their 
perceptive nature they are animals. However, although pertinent, the notion of “dualizers” does not 
seem to be sufficient to do all the work in explaining the nature of the “merely living animals”. 
Aristotelian “dualizers” do not belong to the groups they belong with respect to the same feature, 
whereas in the case of the “merely living animals” it is with respect to one and a same feature, 
namely, their capacity for perception, that their animality is put into question: their perceptive nature 
is so rudimentary that their actions differ hardly from plants’. For dualizing animals, see PA III, 6, 
669a9; IV, 5, 681b1; IV, 10, 689b32 and 690b22; IV, 13, 697b14; GA I, 11, 719a7; 23, 731b9; IV, 4, 
772b1; IV, 6, 774b18; HA I, 1, 488a1; II, 1, 499b12; IV, 4, 529b20; VIII (IX), 13, 598a15. For a 
discussion of this notion see Balme (1987, pp. 85-6) and Lennox (2001a, p. 26). 
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the last phrase of the above HA passage: these are animals, hence perceptive beings, which, 
as their vital activities, do nothing more than nourish and grow. They are plantlike because of 
the nature of their perceptiveness. But could Aristotle have really meant this counterintuitive 
category? 
The pertinence of this question is best shown in a textually problematic phrase, which 
immediately follows the last passage cited from History of Animals. Continuing the idea of a 
progressively increasing complexity in the order of nature, Aristotle says: 
Such [reproductive] activities, then, are common to all alike (πάντων). As sensation is superadded/advances, 
then their lives differ both in regard to mating because of the pleasure and in regard to the birth and rearing of 
their young (588b27-30, modified). 
The textual uncertainty concerns the verbal form of the clause in the genitive absolute 
at 588b28: προσούσης/προιούσης δ' αἰσθήσεως ἤδη. Widely accepted versions (including 
Bekker and Balme editions) take it to be προσούσης. The MSS accepting the alternative are 
not always best.18 So, this passage suggests that, as we follow the increase of complexity 
within the animal world,19 we see the capacity for sensation either as being superadded at a 
certain point or as gradually advancing. This, however, is no small difference. If προσούσης 
(superadded) is correct, the same problem as with Generation of Animals, I. 23, 731b4-7 
arises because, in this case, we must assume that certain members of the animal world are 
deprived of sensation and live solely by virtue of the “plant” in them. But, as discussed 
earlier, there can be no such animal for Aristotle. 
If the alternative, προιούσης, is pursued, then it becomes a matter of gradually 
advancing sensation, within a group of creatures already endowed with sensation. Seen this 
way, the issue will be pointing out the range of differentiation between animals, with regard 
to sensation, from its most rudimentary form to its most advanced. I take this reading to be 
correct, since it fits better with Aristotle’s psychology. Yet, this alternative only works if we 
allow for perceptive beings that have nothing but nutrition and growth as their living 
activities. Such creatures would be plantlike, insofar as they do nothing more than what 
                                                          
18
 For a critical apparatus of this line, see Balme (1991, 64 n.2), and his translation note on the 
opposite page (note e). For relevant information about the manuscript tradition, see his Introduction 
(1991, 30-50). 
19
 I take “πάντων” to refer, not to all living beings, but to animals only. This seems to be the most 
natural reading of the phrase because τόκος, with regard to which certain animals’ lives are said, in 
the second half of the sentence, to differ, is animal parturition. Read this way, the entire sentence 
seems to be designed to make a distinction within one type, namely the animal type of generation. It 
distinguishes the animals that have no other activity than generation from those whose activity of 
generation gets highly complex because of their advanced capacity for pleasure.    
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plants do with their unique principle of life, namely the nutritive soul; yet, they would still be 
animals, since they would behave like plants despite their perceptive nature. This reading 
coheres well with the entire passage because the idea of a gradual change from plants to 
animals seems dependent on the existence of animals, which, though perceptive, do nothing 
beyond actions that are proper to nutritive life. 
However, if animals with only nutritive souls do not exist, then it is, not to the 
exclusion of, but by their capacity for sensation that plantlike animals would be doing nothing 
more than nutritive activities. If “merely living” means being confined to nutritive life, and if 
we are speaking about “merely living” animals, then those creatures must lead a perceptive 
form of nutritive life. Paradoxical as it may sound, such animals would be plantlike in terms 
of their perceptive nature, and their praxeis would hardly transcend the horizon determined 
by their nutritive faculties. Their actions based on the perceptive faculty would be limited to 
those relevant for nutrition. They would hardly act differently from plants, since their 
perceptive activities would involve little more than the nutritive activities of plants. 
Between plants and animals, then, there is a sort of continuity [συνέχεια] with regard to 
sensation as well: certain creatures are plantlike—that is, they are living lives restricted to 
nutrition—on account of the very nature of their perceptive capacities. 
 
IV. The nature of the sense of touch 
 
It is already clear from Aristotle’s account that merely living animals live the most 
rudimentary forms of animal life, which means that they live in the most rudimentary states 
of being perceptive. It immediately follows that these animals possess no other sensory 
capacities than contact senses, either touch alone, or both touch and taste.20 According to the 
conclusion from the previous section, these animals perform only nutritive functions with the 
senses they possess. If this is correct, then the morphological simplicity implied at PA II.10, 
655b38-656a8, must be understood to imply that these animals have no other praxeis than 
what they do with their contact senses. Their lives are based exclusively on the nutritive 
functions of the contact senses. Accordingly, the plantlike character of their perceptive 
                                                          
20
 I take touch and taste to be separable, even though Aristotle seems also to suggest the alternative: 
compare DA II.2, 413b6, 414a3 and III.13, 435b6-7 with Sens. 1, 436b12-15. But I believe their 
separability is Aristotle’s considered position. According to him, touch is not only the necessary 
condition for the existence of the other senses (including taste), but it is also the only sense the 
deprivation of which brings necessarily death to the animal (see DA III. 13, 435b2-5). This last point 
is not true for taste. 
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natures must be due to the very nature of their contact senses themselves. For Aristotle, the 
paradigmatic contact sense is the sense of touch.21 Touch is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for being animal; accordingly, it is the only sense common to all animals (DA II.2, 
413b1-9).22 Its necessity for all animals comes from the fact that animals, as opposed to 
plants, obtain their nourishment unconcocted, from without their own bodies and by their 
own efforts,23 and touch serves the conservation of such beings by providing the most basic 
“awareness” of what is beneficial or inimical to them as nutriments.24 As an animal’s primary 
and secure access to food, “touch is the sense of nourishment” (DA II.3, 414b7). Touch has 
this primordial and privileged relation to food because it is perception of the very qualities in 
tangibles that serve to nourish the animal—namely, dry, moist, hot, and cold (414b7-9).25 
Taste, the second tactile sense, is a form of touch because its object, flavor, is tangible. The 
constitution of flavor can be traced back to, and explained in terms of, the differences touch 
identifies. Accordingly, a tasteable body, that is, a body with flavor, is a moist body. 
Although the dry element has the flavor, it is not tasteable unless it is in a moist state (Sens. 4, 
441b19-20).26 What the animal discriminates (διακρίνει) in the thing it tastes is always a part 
of its global judgment about the thing as comestible. This is why taste, says Aristotle, is “the 
sensation of what is tangible and nutritive” (DA III.12, 434b22),27 and flavor is “an affection 
of what is nutritive [ὁ χυμός ἐστι τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πάθος]” (Sens. 1, 436b17-18).28 
Touch and taste serve, then, the animal’s nutritive faculty. Moreover, although they 
are functions of the perceptive nature of an animal, their activities belong to the larger group 
of functions that nourish an animal. This can best be seen by reference to Aristotle’s 
distinction between the ways these two senses take part in, and contribute to, an animal’s 
                                                          
21
 DA III.13, 435a17-18 underlines the affinity between “to grasp” and “perception by touch”: “Touch 
[ἁφὴ] occurs by direct contact [ἅπτεσθαί], and that is why it has its name.” 
22
 See also DA II.2, 414a3; II.3, 415a3-5; III.12, 434b10-11 and 22-24; II.13, 435a11-b19; Sens. 1, 
436b13-14; HA I.2, 489a117-18; and PA II.8, 653b19-24. 
23
 See Juv. 1, 468a7-11 and PA II.3, 650a20-32. 
24
 See DA III.12, 434b9-24. 
25
 See also DA II.11, 422b25-27; 423b27-29; PA II.1, 647a16-19 and II.3, 650a2-8. On tangible 
qualities, see GC II.2 and II.3, and PA II.1, 646a14-20. 
26
 On taste as a sort of touch, see DA II.10, 422a8-11; Sens. 2, 438b30-439a1 and 4, 441a3; PA 
II.10, 656b38 and II.17, 660a20-21. See also Johansen (1997, 182-188). 
27
 See also DA II.3, 414b11. 
28
 Alexander of Aphrodisias reads “τοῦ γευστικοῦ” instead of “τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ.” Flavor cannot be an 
affection of the nutritive part of the soul, he argues, because the nutritive soul is not perceptive (In 
librum de sensu commentarium 9, 18-10, 11). Ross (1955, 185) takes “τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ” to refer to 
food, that is, as an equivalent of τρόφιμος, as at Sens. 4, 441b24. I follow Ross here. 
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nutrition. He distinguishes the “nutritive” function of an animal’s food from its “growth-
promoting” function. Insofar as the living being represents a certain quantity, food serves to 
increase its bulk and causes growth; but insofar as it serves to maintain an animal’s substance 
as a singular reality, food nourishes it.29 These are two aspects of the work a creature 
performs on its food with its nutritive soul. At Sens. 4, 441b27-442a9, Aristotle elucidates the 
roles touch and taste play in the accomplishment of this work, and retains the distinction 
between the nourishing and the growth-promoting functions of food. The contributions touch 
and taste make to these functions differ according to the qualities they discriminate in 
tangible bodies. Aristotle suggests that, since growth and decay are effected by hot and cold, 
touch pertains to the growth-promoting aspects of the food, while the sweet is the object on 
which animals feed and depend for the continuation of their individual existence.30 The sense 
of taste provides access to what is sweet qua sweet, and the discrimination of flavors is how 
the sense of taste contributes to maintaining existence. By relating the senses of touch and 
taste to two sub-faculties of the nutritive soul (growth and nutrition), these analyses show 
that, in animals, nutritive activities extend beyond the nutritive soul, and the perceptive nature 
of animals has nutritive functions in their overall lives. 
We now have a clearer understanding of what plantlike animals are, and what it 
means for such animals to be plantlike on account of their perceptive natures. Being endowed 
solely and exclusively with tactile senses, these animals’ actions hardly extend beyond those 
proper to nutritive life, and they manifest the faintest signs of being different from plants. 
Their morphological simplicity results from the simplicity of their proper animal natures.  
 
V. The Borderline Animals  
 
a. Sponges 
 
According to History of Animals VII(VIII).1, 588b10-27, five types of sea creatures 
are considered especially worth mentioning, as exemplary cases of the difficulty in marking a 
clear boundary between plants and animals. They are: pinnas, solens [razor shells], ascidians, 
sea anemones, and sponges.31 
                                                          
29
 DA II.3, 416b11-13. See also GC I.5, 322a17-28 and GA I.6, 744b32-36. 
30
 Sens. 4, 441b23-442a12. 
31
 To this list, we may add holothurians and sea lungs, which are described as being unattached yet 
motionless, and as animals deprived of perception (PA IV.5, 681a16-26; for the holothuria as 
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I start with sponges because the question of animality for them is the subject of the 
most ambiguous remarks in the corpus. In the same HA passage (588b10-27), Aristotle 
describes sponges as resembling plants in every respect (παντελῶς). His incredulousness 
about the animality of sponges has an almost verbatim doublet at PA IV.5, 681a15-17. 
These two passages seem, however, to be in contradiction with HA I.1, 487b6-12, 
where Aristotle says: 
Moreover, some animals are stationary; others are mobile. The stationary ones live in water; none of the land 
animals is fixed. In water, many animals live attached, for example, many kinds of hard-shelled creatures. And 
the sponge also seems to have a certain sensation. Its sign is that it is more difficult to tear it off if the movement 
is not made secretly—or so it is said. 
This passage has a doublet at HA V.16, 548b10-12. Besides, at 549a7 (in the same 
chapter), Aristotle seems to give his consent to a “plain agreement” among men on the 
perceptive nature of one species of sponge called “the unwashable.”  
Although these passages appear to contradict each other,32 I tend to think Aristotle’s 
standard view is represented by those passages that recognize sensation in sponges, whereas 
he makes those comments that seem to deny it for rhetorical value. 
Aristotle’s interest in sponges was led, less by the question of knowing whether they 
were perceptive, than by the frailness of their animality in all respects. However, frail or not, 
in order to be acknowledged as animals, sponges had to pass the test of sensation. The above 
passage from HA (I.1, 487b6-12) is a good example: Aristotle dogmatically appeals to 
sensation to justify classifying sponges as animals.33 Appearing in an introductory chapter, in 
which Aristotle sketches the program for the entire book, this passage provides an example of 
one of many zoological differences to be investigated throughout the book. Sponges are an 
example of stationary water animals. So, their animality is not of special concern here. 
However, the sponge is such a creature that, in order to view it as a certain kind of animal, 
one must first show good reason to view it as an animal at all. Thus, Aristotle initially gives 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
motionless see also HA I.1, 487b15). They are compared to some plants that are able to live 
unattached. To explain these creatures, Lloyd (1996, 80-82) suggests that Aristotle was not dogmatic 
about perception as the criterion of animality. Far from solving the difficulty, his suggestion doubles 
it: if we accept these creatures as animals—despite their lack of perception—we also need to explain 
why the unattached plants, to which they are compared, are not equally animals. Rather than giving up 
one of the most fundamental principles of Aristotle’s psychology, I would prefer a chronological 
explanation about the development of his thought. Until then, I take Aristotle to contradict himself. 
32
 According to David Balme, Aristotle would have learned about the perceptiveness of sponges after 
he wrote the passages denying it (1991, 23 and 64 note b). Lloyd (1996, 75 note 9) is critical of 
Balme’s suggestion. See also Lennox (2001b, 301). 
33
 This passage provides a good counterexample to Lloyd’s suggestion that Aristotle was not dogmatic 
about perception as the criterion of animality. 
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credit to the story about sponges contracting when approached, since it is a sign of 
perceptivity. 
On the other hand, the passages that seem to deny sensation to sponges support the 
idea that these creatures would be less interesting as plants than as frail animals for Aristotle. 
He wants sponges to be animals, but he likes them to be so in a weak way. First of all, neither 
HA VII(VIII) nor PA IV explicitly deny sensation in sponges. The first speaks of the absence 
of any signs, not of the absence of sensation itself.34 The second compares sponges to plants 
in terms of being attached and unable to live if detached. Nevertheless, the difficulty in 
finding a more powerful proof of the perceptivity of sponges than their instant contraction at 
the approach of a hand seems to lead Aristotle to consider the weakness of this proof as 
sufficient reason for its negligibility when there is need for good support for his idea of 
gradual change, in the order of nature, from plants to animals. In other words, the weakness 
of the evidence actually supports Aristotle’s intuition of gradual change in the order of 
nature: He seems to think that, given the weak evidence in favor of their perceptivity, and, 
given their stationary mode of life, sponges can be said to resemble plants completely. As I 
understand it, the point here is to point out the frailty of sponge animality, not to put it into 
question altogether. So, when he seems hesitant about sponge perception, Aristotle does not 
want to deny animality in them; rather, he wants to be convincing about the idea of a gradual 
change from plants to animals. 
Aristotle can maintain this ambivalent attitude about sponges, without settling the 
issue decisively, because their case permits that. Their case constitutes a good example of the 
close relation between the sense of touch and nutritive activities. Certain sponges exemplify 
the simplest and the most immediate state of this relation because they, according to 
Aristotle’s description, do the minimum of what animals can do with the sense of touch: they 
use it exclusively for nutritive goals: 
All sponges grow either attached to rocks or on sea beaches and they feed on slime. Its sign is that, when they 
are caught, they appear to be full of slime. This is also characteristic of other living beings that get their 
nourishment from their points of attachment (HA V.16, 548b5-548b8). 
Sponges are attached to rocks or to beaches by the lower parts of their bodies, which 
are covered by a sort of membrane (548b32). The fact that sponges are found to be full of 
slime when torn off suggests that they take their nourishment inside their bodies. As a 
consequence, their “roots” (548b17) do not serve for reaching and getting an already 
                                                          
34
 See Lloyd (1996, 67 and 73-74). 
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concocted food from slime, unlike plants.35 Aristotle seems to mean that the rootlike parts of 
their bodies are used for absorbing slime through the points at which they attach to the 
ground. He suggests, then, that the perceptive activity of sponges is limited to discriminating 
and appropriating nourishment by the intermediary of touch. They use sensation as a function 
of their global nutritive activities, but this does not make their bodies more structured than 
plants’ bodies. Since their food is not concocted beforehand, sponges must be classified 
together with creatures that obtain their food in a raw state, by their own efforts, and from 
outside their bodies: animals. 
However, this interpretation is challenged at HA V.16, 548b12-15. By the end of the 
passage, where he reports the contraction of sponges when approached by hands, Aristotle 
remarks: 
It makes (ποιεῖ) the same thing in windy weather and wavy sea for not being plucked off (πρὸς τὸ μὴ 
ἀποπίπτειν). But some people do not agree with this, as, for instance, the people of Torone. 
The first part of this sentence is marked with overtly teleological language: sponges 
are said to make (ποιεῖ) the contracting movement for (πρὸς) tightening their hold.36 This use 
of touch is already doing something else and more than mere immediate nutrition.  
Yet, Aristotle feels the need to note Toronean reservations on this issue. I can see no 
good reason to suppose that Aristotle would have taken the word of Toroneans less seriously 
than that of sponge divers for the perceptiveness of sponges. So, when Aristotle cites the 
Toronean disagreement about sponge behaviors in a tumultuous sea, I take him to 
acknowledge and note it as testimony to the existence of at least one kind of sponge that does 
not contract in order to tighten its hold and does not, therefore, use touch for a purpose 
beyond immediate nutrition. 
In the same chapter of the History of Animals, Aristotle first divides sponges into two 
comprehensive groups, loose-textured (μανός)37 and close-textured (πυκνός),38 and then 
                                                          
35
 For a comparison between the digestive systems of plants and animals, see PA II.3, 650a2-32. See 
also Juv. 1, 468a4-12. 
36
 The use of πρὸς, instead of the more usual and technical ἕνεκα, for finality to discuss sponge 
contraction during stormy weather suggests that the teleology involved in this use of touch is a weaker 
kind, in the sense that it is not necessitated by the animal’s formal nature. For this usage of πρὸς by 
Aristotle and its relation to animal living well, see Leunissen (2010, 20 and 96) and Lennox (2001b, 
291). 
37
 HA V.16, 548b1 and b19. Useful information about the naming and divisions of marine 
invertebrates can be found in Voultsiadou and Vafidis (2007). 
38
 HA V.16, 548b1, b9, b20, and b25. 
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mentions a third species called Achilleios.39 He identifies two species of the close-textured 
group, ἀπλυσίας40 and τράγος.41 Loose-textured sponges are said to be stronger than close-
textured sponges because the latter’s attachment extends over a smaller area. So, we may 
suppose that loose-textured sponges and the Achilles, which is said to be “exceptionally 
strong,” would not need to tighten their holds because they are already strong. The τράγος 
(goat) is particularly hard and rough, says Aristotle, which implies that they live in windy and 
stormy regions because, as Aristotle suggests, such weather conditions tend to harden 
sponges. Thus, those sponges in the Hellespont are hard and rough. From this information, 
we may deduce that “goats,” being less strong than loose-textured large sponges, do tighten 
their holds. In reference to the testimony of Toroneans, it is not surprising that the calmer sea 
of the Toronean harbor hosts the non-tightening species. In his collection of proverbs, 
Zenobius says that, because it is separated from the sea by two narrow passages, the sound of 
the sea was never heard in the harbor. This, according to Zenobius, is the origin of the 
proverb: “Deafer than the port of Torone” (κωφότερος τοῦ Τορωναίου λιμένος).42 So, it is 
most probable that the sponges of Torone harbor were not “goats,” which explains why they 
would not behave like them and would not use their bodies and touch for tightening their 
holds. This conclusion may have more of an evolutionary spin than we would expect from 
Aristotle, but he would not deny that animals have features that enable them to respond to 
their ecological conditions. His analyses of the correlation between variations in external 
parts of different kinds of birds, and in their actions and modes of life, are good examples of 
this (PA IV.12). What Aristotle would not say is that an animal kind developed such features 
in response to ecological conditions. 
 
b. Sea anemones 
 
Aristotle’s account of sea anemones (ἀκαλήφη or κνίδη) is more cohesive than that of 
sponges. He distinguishes two kinds, the edible (ἀκαλήφη ἐδώδιμος) and the hard (ἀκαλήφη 
σκληρός).43 According to Aristotle’s description, their common features are:44 they are 
                                                          
39
 HA V.16, 548b1-4 and b20. 
40
 Its full description can be found at HA V.16, 549a3-11. 
41
 HA V.16, 548b4-5. This is a subspecies of πυκνός. 
42
 Proverbia Graecorum, cent. iv. pr. 68. 
43
 HA IV.6, 531b11 and V.16, 548a24. 
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perceptive; they have no shells, but their entire bodies are fleshy; they attach themselves to 
rocks; they have mouths at the center of their bodies and feed by seizing upon and clinging to 
their prey; and they have no excretion.45 
The fundamental difference between them is significant for our purposes: the edible 
kind uses touch to loosen and reattach itself, whereas the hard kind, ἀκαλήφη σκληρός, 
“never loosens its hold upon the rocks,” and seems to use touch—besides its discriminative 
function—to seize upon and cling to edible things that fall upon it.46 Although this creature 
has a “mouth” for taking food into its body, its digestive system seems so simple that it 
produces no residue.47 Compared to sponges, the presence of mouths is already a step 
forward in morphological complexity. However, in the case of fixed anemones, their 
morphological complexity does not seem to take them beyond mere living: given the fleshy 
uniform nature of their entire bodies and the simplicity of their digestive systems, their use of 
touch for seizing and clinging to prey looks less like hunting than an integrated stage of the 
nutritional process. That is, the fleshy body itself works as a part of the animal’s nutritive 
system and no more. In this respect, they are like sponges, which seem to use their bodies to 
absorb their nutriment. 
Things are different for ἀκαλήφη ἐδώδιμος, which “detaches itself and changes its 
place.”48 That this kind loosens and reattaches itself serves three basic goals: it breaks loose 
during the night to seek food;49 it uses the rock to which its attaches as a shell for 
protection;50 and it changes place according to the seasons, slipping into rock crevices when 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
44
 A general description of sea anemones appears at HA IV.6, 531a33-b16; HA VII(VIII).2, 590a27-33 
and PA IV.5, 681a36-b8. 
45
 HA VII(VIII).2, 590a30 says the contrary, which conflicts with HA IV.6, 531b9 and PA IV.5, 
681b7. 
46
 HA VII(VIII).2, 590a27; PA IV.5, 681b5. 
47
 Actually, some animals do not produce residue for a different reason than plants. Plants do not 
produce it because their nourishment is already concocted in the soil. If some animals produce no 
residue, it is because they concoct less because they have low body heat. Less concoction results in 
less residue (see PA III.9, 672a20-21; IV.3, 677b29-35, and GA V.3, 783a25-28). So, their 
resemblance to plants in this respect does not make them really plants; rather, they have low life 
energy, just like plants. 
48
 HA V.16, 548a26-27; see also IV.6, 531a33 and b7. 
49
 HA I.1, 487b13; PA IV.5, 681b2-3. 
50
 This is analogous to the way an oyster uses its shell; see HA IV.6, 531b4-5 and VII(VIII).2, 590a30-
32. 
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oppressed by heat.51 It is evident that this kind of anemone uses touch and its body for several 
different actions, beyond immediate nutrition. 
 
c. Ascidians 
 
Ascidians are a species of Testacea and have the peculiarity that they are entirely 
enveloped by their shells.52 Within this shell, they have a fleshy part, enclosed by a sinewy 
membrane. They have two passages leading outwards through the shell, and it is through 
these orifices that they admit and discharge seawater. Ascidians, says Aristotle, have no 
excretion, other than surplus moisture, and, in this respect, resemble plants. That they can live 
only if attached to some other object is another of their plantlike features. Nonetheless, 
Aristotle thinks ascidians are more akin to animals than are sponges because of their fleshy 
interiors.53 
The ascidian does not use its fleshy part to attach itself to rocks, but rather attaches by 
the shell. The fleshy part, together with the membrane enclosing it, has the function of 
straining the water it takes in,54 and this process of percolation makes seawater fresher. Like 
all other testacea, this is the ascidian’s way of nourishment.55 So, its fleshy part seems to play 
a role in the process of nutrition. Yet, it is not equally evident that the capacity for touch in 
the fleshy part is used in the percolation process. One might assume that the sense of touch 
functions as an absorbing power in percolation. But the wax vessel experiment, described at 
HA VII (VIII).2, 590a22-26, clearly shows that the percolation by the fleshy part does not 
necessarily require any power of absorption. The experiment aims at testing the presence of 
drinkable water in the sea. It consists in making a vessel of wax and putting it in the sea; after 
a night and day, it fills with drinkable water (τὸ πότιμον). The percolation process filters and 
separates the earthy salty stuff, so the only water let into the vessel becomes potable. Just as 
the wax in this experiment, the fleshy part of the ascidian plays no greater part than to filter 
                                                          
51
 HA IV.6, 531b16. 
52
 HA IV.4, 528a18-20. 
53
 PA I.5, 681a10-35. 
54
 One fundamental difference between ascidians and sea anemones lies in the fact that, although 
anemones obtain nourishment in water and cannot live outside water, they take in neither water nor air 
(HA I.1, 487b25). 
55
 See PA IV.7, 683b22-23 and HA VII(VIII).2, 590a22. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.9, n.1. p. 115-134, 2015. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p115-134 
130
  
seawater. So, it is not quite clear whether this animal uses its faculty of touch for any 
nutritive action. 
One might still argue that, if salt water becomes potable, hence sweet (γλυκύς), by 
filtration,56 the ascidian must be using its fleshy part for taste. Aristotle assumes that, where 
there is potable sweet water, there is nourishment for animals and their offspring.57 Thus, the 
ascidian, too, feeds on the sweet water produced by percolation. It is percolation itself that 
produces the animal’s nourishment, insofar as this process is concoction (590a21).58 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the ascidian tastes the sweet produced, since 
taste in animals takes place before concoction, not afterwards. 
At most, we can conclude that, since the ascidian has an observable fleshy part, it must be 
perceptive; yet, it is not as obvious that it performs any nutritive action by its sensation. 
Aristotle himself does not seem to mean any more than that. When he asserts that the ascidian 
is more akin to animals than the sponge, he does not seem offer a better reason than that its 
fleshy part may be easily observed.59 
 
d. The Pinna and the Razor shell 
 
With the pinna and the razor shell, which are testacea, the threshold of doing more 
than mere nutrition seems to get crossed for good. This is for three reasons. First, these 
creatures’ fleshy parts are bundles of viscera-like structures.60 All testacea (except ascidians) 
have internal parts that Aristotle identifies by the names of parts of blooded animals, either 
because of their morphological similarity, or on the basis of functional analogy. So, like all 
other bivalves, the pinna and the razor shell als o have a head, horns, a mouth, a “tongue,” a 
gut, a stomach, and a passage for excretion. Yet, according to Aristotle, viscera and their 
                                                          
56
 The same wax example is also given at Metr. II.3, 358b34-59a7. A more elaborate explanation of 
the production of sweet from salty seawater by percolation can be found there. See also Metr. II.2, 
354b17-18; GA III.11, 761b1; and Prob. XXIII.19, 933b20. 
57
 HA VI.13, 567b12-19; VII(VIII).13, 598a30-31 and b5; VIII(IX).19, 601b18-19; GA III.11, 761b1-
2. 
58
 Concoction by way of natural heat is what distinguishes the salty and the bitter from what is sweet 
in a nourishing substance. By separating the sweet ingredient, concoction prepares nourishment for 
the living being. See Sens. 4, 442a4-8 and also Polansky (2007, 193 n.6). 
59
 PA IV.5, 681a27-28. At HA IV.8, 535a24, Aristotle says ascidians appear to have a sense of smell, 
though poorly developed, but offers no explanation. This simply does not make sense, if the animal 
has no other sensory organ than its fleshy part, as Aristotle affirms two chapters earlier at HA IV.6, 
531a28. 
60
 See HA IV.4, 529a26-b19 and PA IV.5, 679b34-37. 
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analogue are non-uniform in shape.61 So, considered together with their shells, these 
creatures’ entire bodies are differentiated between uniform and non-uniform parts. Compared 
to the animals already discussed, this is a high level of functional and morphological 
variation. The second reason follows from the first: with internal organs, these animals’ 
activities, relative to nutrition, become highly complex and mediated. Variation in parts 
follows from variations in purposes and actions, whence the third reason: the pinna, at least, 
opens and closes its shell. These two movements have distinct purposes: opening lets 
seawater in for percolation,62 while closing protects its fleshy part and preserves its natural 
heat.63 Though they are related to nutrition, these two actions are not immediately nutritive. 
They introduce, in fact, mediation to the animal’s nutritive life. 
With such a highly differentiated digestive system, nutrition ceases to be an 
immediate function of the sense of touch and its bodily part; rather, nutrition becomes 
mediated by different actions, performed by internal parts and moving shells. One might 
object that, in the case of ascidians as well, touch seems to have no direct nutritive function. 
But, there seems to be no good reason to suppose the ascidian’s body is more structured than 
a plant’s: the teleological relation between a shell protecting the inner fleshy part does not 
seem to be more “differentiated” than the relation between a plant’s leaf and the pericarp. 
However, this objection may help us develop further precision about merely living animals: 
what makes these animals merely alive is not only that they live a simple life confined to 
nutritive activities (despite their perceptive natures), but also that they live it in the most 
simple and the most immediate way possible for an animal. 
A clearer glimpse of the distinction between merely living and its beyond in the case 
of these most primitive sea creatures can be gained, if we consider the sea urchin, which is 
also a testacean (PA IV.5, 680a24-681a2). The urchin has “eggs” in its body.64 The animal’s 
body is so arranged that, to each of its five segments are distributed five “eggs,” five teeth, 
and five stomach compartments. Five is the necessary number of “eggs” because, if there 
were fewer, it “would not serve a good purpose” (τὸ μὲν οὐ βέλτιον, 680b26) because fewer 
                                                          
61
 Though non-uniform in shape, they are uniform in material, as at PA II.1, 647a34-35 and b8-9. 
62
 PA IV.7, 683b18-24. 
63
 PA II.8, 654a1-7 and IV.5, 679b13-31. 
64
 According to Aristotle, this is a misnomer because the so-called “eggs” are nothing more than 
necessary residual products of good nourishment and have no generative function. 
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than five segments of its body would benefit from their protective function.65 More than five 
is impossible, says Aristotle, because, in that case, they would be quite continuous, which 
would be against the common nature of the class of hard-shelled animals to which the urchin 
belongs. The same idea of a balanced arrangement explains the compartmental structure of 
the stomach, which is also divided into five: 
Otherwise, if the stomach were one, the eggs would either be distant from it, or it would occupy the entire 
cavity, which would make it difficult for the sea urchin to move about and to find sufficient food to fill the 
cavity. But as it is, there are five eggs separated by five intervals, and so there must be five departments of the 
stomach, one for each interval (680b31-35). 
The way the urchin’s body is arranged is not only good for its protection, but also best 
for its moving capacity. On the other hand, the quality of its moving capacity contributes to 
its feeding. Compared to the life of a sponge, the life of a sea urchin deserves to be regarded 
as a success story, which could have turned out otherwise, as Aristotle implies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I set out to explore the nature of those animals to which Aristotle tacitly refers at PA 
II.10, 655b38-656a8 as “partaking only of living”. I concluded that it is possible to make 
sense of this distinction if we consider that some of animals, which are solely endowed with 
contact senses, do nothing more than nutrition by their sensation. Though they are perceptive, 
the praxeis of their lives are confined to mere immediate nutrition. These animals seem to 
only live due to the immediacy of the very few actions of which they are capable. Even their 
perceptive activities are barely distinguishable from nutrition. The absence of signs of 
perception in some of these animals can be understood this way. I claimed that this 
conclusion follows, if we consider the nutritive functions of the contact senses. On the 
Aristotelian scala naturae, the mere nutritive use of the sense of touch determines a threshold 
beyond which certain animal species do never go. The difference marked by this threshold 
has been partially illustrated by the examples of sponges tightening their holds in stormy 
weather, sea anemones loosening their holds to seek food, and the interdependence between 
the inner bodily organization and capacities for moving and nutrition in sea urchins.  
According to these results, we have sufficient reason to conclude that some of the 
“merely living” animals in Aristotle’s zoology would be the following: among sponges, the 
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 See Lennox (2001b, 300). The “eggs” of the urchin correspond to fat in blooded animals, and fat 
has a certain protective function; see PA II.5, 651a36 and III.9, 672a12-20. 
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loose-textured, the kind called Achilles, and the kind found in the gulf of Torone (already 
large and strong, they do not tighten their holds); of the two kinds of anemones, the fixed and 
hard kind—that is, the ἀκαλήφη σκληρός (because it does not loosen its hold to feed); and, 
among testacea, the ascidians (their bodies being no more structured than the bodies of 
plants).66 
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